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Abstract 
Humanity embarks on epistemological quests in order to achieve knowledge that could in turn minister 
to human needs. Knowledge by this token becomes a tool for problem-solving. The human specie 
therefore theorizes in order to explain myriad difficult existential challenges and to gain firm control of 
their environment. John Dewey in the 20th century advances his instrumentalism postulate, which 
proposes a reconstruction in philosophy. He proposes a pragmatic reconstruction of truth in terms of 
its practical function such that knowledge, morality and even education could be instrumentalized. 
Dewey adopts the scientific methodology of experimentalism in order to fully achieve his 
instrumentalism. Regrettably, he overemphasizes the method of science as all sufficing and this renders 
society’s set goals indeterminate and breeds solipsism. When knowledge and morality get 
instrumentalized, morality becomes relativized leaving no possibility of a reference to any fixed moral 
code. This research therefore aims to expose the moral and epistemological implications of Dewey’s 
instrumentalism. The author adopts the textual analysis method of enquiry and suggests a humanization 
of instrumentalism, which protects human dignity and personhood as well as promotes the safe 
appropriation of the positive benefits of the scientific adventure. 
Keywords: Morality, Epistemology, Instrumentalism, Personhood. 
1.1 Introduction 
Science as “knowledge which derives from experience, observation, experimentation and arranged in an 
organized or orderly manner” (Uduigwomen,2007, p.20), has no doubts helped man to master his environment. 
As Morris (1964) points out, “advances in science and technology have increased man’s power to effect his will 
and to produce the kind of things this modern civilization demands (p.38). In this quest for pragmatic knowledge, 
John Dewey got disappointed with the approaches of philosophies prior to his time, hence, he introduces his 
version of instrumentalism, which abandons previous epistemological theories of both rationalism and 
empiricism, having considered them as hindrances to the task of problem-solving. Dewey rather conceives the 
task of philosophy as constituted of reconstruction in terms of the problems that confront man as science does 
hence, his rejection of the classical understanding of epistemology. Not only does he shy away from using the 
term epistemology in its classical sense, (Which he replaces with the term, instrumentalism), Dewey also rejects 
ethics as a branch of knowledge and says that it is based on apriori reasoning or divine precept. Consequent 
upon this rejection, Dewey contends that desirable moral conduct is a function of participation in the social 
group or communal living. His disproportionate faith in science persuaded him to apply his scientific method 
on morality and further maintains that only the rise of the method of science in ethics can secure the continued 
adoption of values to changing human needs. Dewey’s instrumentalism espouses the idea that cognition 
constitutes in the task of forgoing ideal tools or instruments with which to cope with any giving situation that 
may evolve” (Ihejirika, 2015, p.3). 
This Science Zealot, (Dewey) claims that man’s sole nature is to successfully master his universe through science. 
In his Essay in Experimental Logic: published in 1916, Dewey insists that philosophy and theology be made 
subjects under science. Dewey’s Instrumentalism as couched in the afore-mentioned document gives us the 
impression that life itself is experimental but unfortunately, reality indicates otherwise. This paper observes that 
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such approach to life is fraught with errors hence, the history of techno-scientific enterprise bears witness that 
“no sooner had it gathered momentum than “…man started to loose his human quality for his human quantity” 
(Ijioma, 1996,p.vii).Our particular disturbance which prompts our present research is therefore, the overbearing 
implications of Dewey’s instrumentalism on morality and epistemology. These are found to breed epistemic 
naivety and solipsism whenever and wherever Dewey’s instrumentalism pill is swallowed uncritically. In Dewey’s 
expression of his scientific faith, he plays down on morality, which guides humanity to positively appropriate the 
benefits of the adventure, called science. His suggestion that science has all the answers and should be allowed 
to operate without a moral umpire is too bogus to be tolerated.  
Granted that Dewey’s instrumentalism avails much progress and resolves hitherto trouble-shooting 
philosophical issues occasioned by traditional empiricist and rationalist ideologies, this paper considers his 
uncritical ingestion, prescription and glorification of science as unphilosophical. Dewey seems to forget that the 
most important of all scientific answers aim to serve the interest of humanity hence, Maslow (1990) asserts that 
“The apex of human mental activity is witnessed in self-fulfillment” (p.46). When human values are sacrificed at 
the altar of scientific method, science becomes destructive as in the case of its misapplication in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki during the world war II (1939-1945) and subsequent wars.  
Our paper therefore, makes a case for the moral fibre of existence which is the missing link in Dewey’s 
instrumentalism. It is this moral fibre that guides and informs the reflective consciousness of man (the reason 
for which the human being is distinct from beasts). Consequently, this study suggests a humanization of 
instrumentalism. This is hoped to protect human dignity and personhood via a moral and epistemological 
orientation, which will still welcome the positive benefits of science and technology. We shall therefore proceed 
to expose Dewey’s pragmatic thoughts, his notion of instrumentalism and further draw the moral and 
epistemological implications of Dewey’s instrumentalism before rounding off with a conclusion.  
1.2 Dewey’s Pragmatic Thoughts/Instrumentalism 
Dewey couches his pragmatic thoughts in three dimensions, which might not be easily noticeable to an average 
reader of Dewey’s work. The first of these is its ecological side. This aspect relates to the mutual influence, which 
the human as well as plants and animals exert on the environment and the response they get from it. The second 
part is what has properly speaking, been called the pragmatic side of his philosophy. This second aspect of John 
Dewey’s pragmatic thought has much to do with those aspects of his teaching, which border on concepts like 
verification, experimentation, truth and meaning of ideas and in the majority of cases, it is also called the 
epistemology of his epistemology. The third aspect of Dewey’s pragmatic thought is the critical aspect of his 
pragmatism namely, instrumentalism. This theory revolutionizes traditional philosophy by launching a verbal 
attack on traditional notions of truth. Dewey does this rejection by replacing polemically the old conception of 
truth as static, with a new social order which sees truth as communitarian and interactive. As Robert and Kathleen 
(1996) submit: “By this rejection of traditional notions of truth, Dewey tends to have effected an epistemological 
revolution with similar content as the works of Copernicus and Immanuel Kant in the history of Philosophy 
(p.256). He expressly rejects the term, epistemology preferring “The Theory of Enquiry” as more representative 
of his approach. Jones and Fogelin (1969) observe that for Dewey, pragmatism “was not an epistemological 
theory as it was for Pierce, but a therapeutic device” (p.36).  
However, our major focus in this work namely, his instrumentalism fluctuates between the second but mainly 
the third aspect of his pragmatic theory of truth. Yet, for us to adequately explain how John Dewey developed 
his instrumentalism, our point of entry is to acknowledge that Dewey’s pragmatism is not only multi-dimensional 
but also interrelated (both within itself and other pragmatic thoughts prior to his time); hence, it cannot be 
explained in isolation. Dewey’s pragmatism is in many respects a brain child of his predecessors, mainly William 
James and Charles Sanders Pierce. Thus, their closeness seems to suggest that the deeper we go into attempts 
to understand the three figures, the further we are able to understand the pragmatism of each of them. This is 
not to say that there is no distinction between their thoughts and Dewey’s. He distinguished himself by bringing 
their philosophies (Pierce and James) to their seemingly logical conclusion. In Dewey, we see an advanced 
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capacity to synthesize disparate thoughts. As Law head observes: Dewey synthesized the logical and scientific 
concerns of Pierce with the moral and humanistic ideals of James” (p.472).  
Dewey’s instrumentalism starts from the point of view of fallibilism: “that absolute certainty about knowledge 
could at least in principle be mistaken” (Luke & Mastin, 2008, p.218). Man, in his environment, is an active 
participating agent and keeps updating his intellect with new challenging experiences. This particular conception 
brought to birth Dewey’s concept of instrumentalism. Dewey built his instrumentalist system of thought from 
Jamesian assertion that ‘theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas in which, we can rest” (William,1975, 
p.68). Thus Dewey (1931) sees instrumentalism as: 
an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgement and inferences in their various forms, 
by considering primarily how thoughts function in the experimental determinations of future consequences… 
that is to say, it attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them 
from the reconstructive or meditative function ascribed to reason (pp.463-473). 
Ihejirika(2015) submits that: “Dewey calls his pragmatic theory instrumentalism in order to distinguish it from 
other forms of pragmatism (p.93). The term however captures Dewey’s emphasis that ideas are tools for solving 
problems and/or shaping our environment to suit our ends. Dewey’s instrumentalism holds that “thought, 
thinking, inquiry and ideas are instruments of solving practical problems” (Dewey, 1977,p.50). Inquiry for Dewey, 
becomes “a progressive transformation of an indeterminate situation into a more determinate situation towards 
a unified whole (Dewey,1960, pp.130-136). Lawhead (2002) reports that: “Dewey battles in his instrumentalism 
what he calls spectator theory of knowledge, which describes the assumption that thinking refers to fixed things 
in nature and the view, which presents the mind as a classroom detached from the world, containing ideas the 
way a museum contains pictures” (p.472). 
Dewey accuses traditional epistemological positions of rationalism and empiricism of conceiving the mind as 
instruments for considering what is fixed and certain in nature. He rejects this kind of knowing which Okaegbu 
(2012) avers that “this image of the mind existing in isolation from external world is what led philosophers like 
Descartes to wonder whether anything at all is outside the mind” (pp.52-67). Stumpf (1994) submits that for 
Dewey therefore, the mind or more specifically, intelligence is a fixed substance and knowledge is not a set of 
static concepts (p.349). In fact, the more active reason Dewey rejects earlier ways of philosophizing is simply 
because they constitute for him, a hindrance to the task of problem-solving. He argues that they separate 
theorizing from practical concerns and focus on absolute solution to philosophical norms. Consequently, he 
decides to place knowing on a new and actual setting namely, contextualism. He therefore claims that the only 
prospect of substantial progress in the theory of knowledge is in this new contextual logic, a method of knowing 
“essentially in terms of the biological and psychological role that the mind plays in the knowing process in 
human affairs” (Sydorsky, 2008, p.197). 
For the sake of brevity, it will be helpful to note these peculiar assumptions of Dewey’s instrumentalism as noted 
by Ihejirika (2015) and they include the following: 
- All concepts and hypothesis function as instruments 
- All logical forms we use in the course of inquiry are understood as ideal instruments.  
- All practical consequences of theories should be identified as instruments. 
- All beliefs and culture are instruments. 
- The air we breathe is an instrument. 
- Terrorism is considered an instrument. 
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- Weapons of war are all instruments. 
- The human intellect/brain is an instrument. 
- All human beings are instruments (p.96). 
Now, the foregoing seems to be saying that all things are instruments and all instruments are things. As one will 
observe from the above assumptions, some of the conceived instruments may have destructive consequences. 
A destructive instrumental conception can lead to ignition of unquenchable fire as well as long term social 
disharmony. On the other hand, if we assume that at the long run such conceived instruments can bring about 
peace and social harmony as in the popular assumption that after wars come calmer peace. Can we assuredly 
say that this is the understanding Dewey reaches about his concept of instrumentalism? If it is, then we may still 
find ourselves in an epistemological merry-go-round, a vicious cycle which only Darwinian evolutionary 
influence can engender. The forgoing query necessitates an in-depth study of Dewey’s instrumentalist 
submission in order to uncover its’ implications. 
1.3 Moral Implications of Dewey’s Instrumentalism 
Morality discusses the quality of being right or wrong, which more often than not, has to do with the degree of 
conformity or non conformity to conventional rules.  Ordinarily, moral reflections as Audi (1999) observes 
involves “consideration of others” (p.512). The moral status of a theory is pertinent to humane living hence, the 
discipline of moral epistemology tries to sort out the epistemic status and relations of moral judgment and 
principles and how they affect lived life. As earlier remarked in our introduction, Dewey seems to downplay the 
place of morality in human affairs hence, his suggestion that “science should operate without a moral umpire” 
(Dewey, 1922, p.32) and should not even be subjected to the guidance of any other institution of the society. In 
his struggle to secularize and instrumentalize anything religious, Dewey created an intolerable lacuna in his 
instrumentalism as we will subsequently discover. But that does not mean that Dewey’s ethics are generally 
unacceptable. For instance, Elizabeth Anderson in her “Dewey’s Moral Philosophy” avers that: 
Dewey’s ethics replace the goals of identifying an ultimate end or supreme principles that can 
serve as a criterion of ethical evaluation with the goal of identifying a method for improving 
our value judgments. Dewey argued that ethical inquiry is of a piece with empirical enquiry. 
More generally, it is the use of reflective intelligence to revise one’s judgement in light of the 
consequences of acting on them. Value judgements are tools of enabling the satisfactory 
redirection of conduct when habit no longer suffices to direct it. As tools, they can be evaluated 
instrumentally, in terms of their success in guiding conduct (Edward 2010, p.207). 
Granted that there may be aspects of the above citation that reflect existential truths, a truer inquirer discovers 
that if Anderson’s interpretation of Dewey is anything to rely upon, then even the same foregoing citation indicts 
Dewey. When there is no moral code which acts as a norm, disorderliness becomes the order of the day. In a 
lawless society, where there is lack of any reference to a more or even a legal code, life must certainly turn 
brutish in the style of the Hobbessian state of nature. Again, reality indicates that Dewey’s equation of ethical 
inquiry with empirical enquiry leaves much to be desired. The truth remains that there is no laboratory that 
suffices to experimentally tell us the good from the bad. Given that actions are carried out within human 
environment as Dewey rightly observes, it necessarily follows that lack of a criterion of reference that readily 
defines good or bad, right or wrong will leave society confused on what is morally acceptable or otherwise. 
When a society scientifically flourishes without a safe-guard of human dignity and personhood which morality 
engenders, then such society in the words of Ihejirika, may end up “developing their process of 
underdevelopment” (2012, p.04). It is in tandem with the foregoing feeling that Omoregbe, (1990) warns that: 
“if a nation produces intellectual giants but who are moral dwarfs, it is simply producing obstacles to its own 
development… educated men with very low degree of morality are the greatest obstacles to the development 
of their country” (p.199). 
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Beside this, one conspicuous shortcoming of science is that it is ignorant of values and cannot answer questions 
about aesthetic and metaphysical realities, Alan Kazlev in this direction observes that modern science does not 
admit of any reasoning beyond the empirical. Kazlev (2014), maintains that “the mechanical model of 
explanation is what, most times dominate the so-called value-free physico-mathematical sciences” (p.1). In fact, 
“there is no possible scientific test that can measure whether something is… beautiful or ugly for these are non-
scientific categories and not amendable to determination by any scientific experiment (Ellis,200, p.2). Could this 
be the reason Albert Schweitzer (1961) asserts that, “the prosperity of a society depends on the moral disposition 
of its members”? (p.76)  
1.4 Epistemological Implications of Dewey’s Instrumentalism 
John Dewey’s notion of instrumentalism is celebrated as a reconciliatory and bold attempt to reconstruct the 
society of his day by advancing a system of thought which engenders democritization of human nations as well 
as promotion of social change through progressive education. His application of instrumentalism to education 
becomes his greatest tremendous success. Kerneling commends Dewey as an outstanding, exponent of 
philosophical naturalism. Philosophical naturalism conceives human thought as having the capacity of crafting 
out solutions to life challenges by proceeding from testing novel hypothesis against experience in order to 
achieve “warranted assertability”. This, in turn yields coherent and meaningful action. Dewey’s instrumentalism 
resolves the dichotomy between the object and subject of knowledge that has long been dominant in the 
arguments of the traditional philosophies of rationalism and empiricism. Dewey espouses the idea that the 
object and subject of our experience interact to produce knowledge. As a believer in constant evolutionary 
change, Dewey argues that there is no absolute truth. Truth for him, is not constant for he contends that any 
idea accepted as truth is subject to change overtime. He therefore conceives truth as a mere “warranted 
assertibility” (Dewey, 1977, p.9).  
The foregoing has enormous implications for epistemology. When truth becomes relativized, whatever anyone 
calls truth becomes truth hence, such relativity may be arbitrarily exploited and may end in epistemic naivety. 
When epistemic naivety gets fully blown, solipsism is born, and such ideological positions are detrimental to 
social cohesion and inimical to development of any polity. In his Experience Nature and Freedom, Dewey (1960), 
espouses the idea that “man’s sole nature is to successfully master his universe through science” (p.149). Dewey 
creates the impression that the whole problem of man is the conquest of his universe through science. 
Subjecting all disciplines under science suggests that all disciplines surrender their methods to that of 
experimental science. By this, he means all inquiries whether philosophical, theological or scientific must proceed 
through tests, observation and building of hypothesis, confirmation and pronouncement of judgement. The 
reality is that many a discipline like theology cannot strictly use the laboratory as in the case of the sciences. For 
Feyeraband (1975), “there is no special method that guarantees success or make it probable” (p.144). Karl Popper 
(1959), warns that “science does not rest upon solid bedrock… we simply stop when we are satisfied that the 
rules are firm enough to carry the structure at least for the time being” (p.4). Since scientific theories are but 
mere bold conjectures to be tested by observations and with the aim of obtaining a decisive refutation, the 
tentative probabilistic result they yield are not worth staking our lives for. This is part of the reason Betrand 
Russel (1983), warns that “when science is not moderated by society, then we must have succeeded in sowing 
seeds of impurity and forms of immoral behavior towards the environment (p.776). In tandem with Russel, Alloy 
Ihuah in “Science, Technology and African Predicament” avers that: 
…science not only offers a one-dimensional image of the person, but also presents the human 
person with the temptation of self-deification, self-destruction and to the detriment of the 
divine nature of man. At best, the legacy of scientific and technological civilization for the 
African could be summarized in what Thoreau says is an improved means to an unimproved 
end. (Asiegbu & Chukwuokolo 2012, p.122-123). 
One of the most popular critics of Dewey namely, Edmonson argues that the best Dewey’s instrumentalist 
approach to knowing could achieve was to reduce students to “lab rats”. Heidegger points us to another 
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shortcoming of instrumental thinking, while he acknowledges that it is justified and even necessary for living a 
life, he claims that instrumental thought (which he calls “calculative thinking) leads to thoughtlessness when 
taken to the extreme. As he puts it, “In always reckoning with conditions that are given, it is prone not only to 
overlook or lose itself in a frenzied ordering of the actual. Calculative thinking races from one project to the 
next… it never stops, never collects itself” (1966, p.46). Bourne is concerned that instrumentalist (calculative) 
thinking restricts philosophy’s range of possibilities and thus limits it. Yet for Heidegger, the risk is that “we may 
come to expect too much of philosophy by demanding that it serves to manipulate the environing world in 
some ways, and thereby overlook its less apparent effects” (1994, p.5). 
2.1 Conclusion 
We have tried to examine the moral and epistemological imports of John Dewey’s instrumentalism postulate in 
this paper. One of the major revelations of this research is that science is not only ignorant of values but its 
method fails to sufficiently provide answers to all of humanity’s innumerable existential questions and 
challenges. An uncritical and blind faith in the scientific method will at best provide us with a lopsided 
perspective of things, which in Dewey’s fashion instrumentalizes both the animate and inanimate constituents 
of man’s environing situation. When this happens, even man himself becomes a means to other ends whereas, 
supposedly the degree or relevance of any knowledge is directly proportional to its services to humanity. If then 
the purpose of any knowledge or theoretical method is thinned down to a parochial instrumentalist scheme 
which neglects the moral dimensions of man, such purpose or theoretical method becomes self-defeating  and 
less productive. Science as a theoretical discipline is meant to serve man but its glorification at the expense of 
the moral or any other aspect of the total man as seen in Dewey’s instrumentalism, will not only end up getting 
men well-schooled to destroy their civilization. It will additionally, equip men epistemologically with a false 
consciousness that enthrones self-glorification, pride and arrogance.  When the result of a particular discipline’s 
method is adjudged the best by members of that same discipline without making allowances for interdisciplinary 
study and criticism, such results end up suffering a limitation that is universally intolerable. These are some of 
the reasons epistemic naivety and solipsism are the greatest enemy of academic research. After all, “we seek 
knowledge … for the guidance of our conduct in life, orientation of our activities and in order to make it minister 
to our needs” (Aja, 2002, p.75). By this token, knowledge should serve the interest of persons not just a person 
all the time, communities not just a community unless, the universal community. Any knowledge that neither 
considers the entire wellbeing of the total man nor has at least, a practical function of having some influences 
or bearing on the actual tenor or conduct of our lives becomes an exercise in futility. 
It is against this backdrop that our paper suggests a humanization of Dewey’s Instrumentalism. Granted that 
instrumentalism is already a humane ideology, it becomes germane that we clarify more on our proposal. 
Dewey’s instrumentalism may be considered humane in some quarters consequent upon the fact that its 
pragmatic elements render it of service to humanity. However, our point is that it needs to get fleshed up and 
enriched with the moral concerns of man.  We kill the world when our ideological leanings fail to have as its 
central focus, the safety of humanity. The upholding of human dignity and personhood, which only proper moral 
orientation of our minds championed by moral philosophy is capable of must constitute our focus in all our 
theorizing. Any attempt to try otherwise will have humanity theorizing itself into extinction. This calls for an in-
depth critical reflection and a sense of judgment, which may be the only available instruments for humanity to 
salvage herself from self-destructive ventures hence, our present reflection. 
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